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Abstract 
This paper explores the idea of judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children in 
New Zealand. Child poverty is an issue that has received increasing attention in New 
Zealand in recent years, and judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights for children is 
one way in which children’s socio-economic rights might be better realised. This paper 
identifies New Zealand’s international obligations towards children and draws on the work 
of children’s rights theorists. It argues that children are a unique category of rights-holders, 
and that this justifies prioritisation of judicial enforcement of their socio-economic rights. It 
explores the different ways in which courts have approached socio-economic rights 
enforcement, and makes a proposal as to how this might work in New Zealand. It concludes 
that the effect of judicial enforcement of children’s socio-economic rights on child poverty 
levels in New Zealand will depend on the type of remedy the courts choose to implement.  
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I Introduction 
There are just over a million children living in New Zealand.1 Using one measure of poverty, 
based on household incomes after housing costs, as many as 270,000 of those children are 
living in poverty. This paper will explore the possibility of giving New Zealand’s children 
judicially enforceable socio-economic rights, with a view to assessing the impact that this 
might have on child poverty in New Zealand.  
Part II begins by explaining the reasons for considering judicially enforceable socio-
economic rights for children in New Zealand. Firstly, I give a brief overview of child poverty 
in New Zealand, drawing on the recent work of the Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to 
Child Poverty, whose report was published in late 2012. Secondly, I explore the “Constitution 
Conversation” which took place in New Zealand in 2013.  I argue that some of the contributions 
from participants in this constitutional review process suggest an openness to the concept of 
judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children. The contributions also suggest that 
participants have concerns about a lack of recognition of the State’s role in upholding 
children’s socio-economic rights.   
 Part III begins with a brief acknowledgement of Wellman’s philosophical objections 
to children possessing rights at all. It then identifies the rights which New Zealand’s children 
possess at international law as a result of New Zealand’s signing and ratifying of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (the UNCRC) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR). Finally, it suggests that judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights for children would enable New Zealand to better meet 
its international obligations. 
Part IV addresses the justifications for judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights 
for children. It argues that children are a unique category of rights-holders who require greater 
protection of their socio-economic rights. Part IV also notes the work of Freeman who brings 
a philosophical challenge to the presumption that children and adults can justifiably possess 
different rights.  
                                                             
1 Statistics New Zealand, Census 2013. For the purposes of this paper, “child” is defined as a human being below 
the age of eighteen years. Most New Zealand legislation defines child in this way. Similarly, Article 1 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child defines child as “every human being below the age of 
eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”  
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Part V discusses the concept of judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for 
children generally, and Part VI explores some of the practical questions around what judicial 
enforcement of children’s socio-economic rights might look like in New Zealand. Part VI also 
explores which judicial socio-economic rights enforcement method might be the most effective 
in lowering child poverty levels in New Zealand.   
II Context  
A Child Poverty in New Zealand  
If every child in New Zealand experienced the full realisation of his or her socio-economic 
rights as guaranteed by the UNCRC, no New Zealand child would be living in poverty.2 Child 
poverty in New Zealand has received increasing attention in recent years. New Zealand’s 
Office of the Children’s Commissioner has identified child poverty as being an area of 
“immediate and fundamental concern” for New Zealand, and reducing child poverty has been 
named as one of the key priorities of the Office’s work.3  The New Zealand Human Rights 
Commission has stated that the levels of poverty experienced by some of New Zealand’s 
children is an issue of particular concern.4 In March 2012, Children’s Commissioner Dr Russell 
Wills established an Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty (EAG). The EAG 
report, Solutions to Child Poverty in New Zealand: Evidence for Action, was published in 
December 2012.5 The Government’s Ministerial Committee on Poverty was invited to respond 
to this report, and did so formally in May 2013.6  
One of the initial difficulties the EAG identified in advising on child poverty in New 
Zealand is that New Zealand does not have an official poverty measure or an agreed definition 
of poverty. The EAG proposed their own definition of child poverty as:7  
…[children] who experience deprivation of the material resources and income that is 
required for them to develop and thrive, leaving such children unable to enjoy their 
                                                             
2 See Geraldine Van Bueren “Committee on the Rights of the Child” in Malcolm Langford (ed) Social Rights 
Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008).  
3 Children’s Commissioner “Our Priorities” <www.occ.org.nz/our-work/our-priorities>.  
4 Human Rights Commission Human Rights in New Zealand 2010: Ngā Tika Tangata O Aotearoa (Human 
Rights Commission, 2010) at 240. 
5 Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty Solutions to Child Poverty in New Zealand: Evidence 
for Action (Expert Advisory Group Final Report, December 2012).  
6 Government Response to the Children’s Commissioner’s Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child 
Poverty (28 May 2013).  
7 Expert Advisory Group, above n 5, at 2.  
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rights, achieve their full potential and participate as equal members of New Zealand 
society. 
In the EAG’s view, this definition acknowledged that a lack of material resources and 
a lack of income are both key components of child poverty. However the EAG also wanted the 
definition to underscore the importance of the socio-economic rights of children as citizens of 
New Zealand, as enunciated in the UNCRC. The EAG suggested that this definition was 
consistent with definitions of child poverty adopted by other developed nations.8 
There are two common approaches to measuring poverty in international literature: 
income-based and deprivation-based measures.9 Income-based measures look to the proportion 
of the population whose disposable household income is below a certain threshold, usually 50 
or 60 per cent of median disposable household income. Disposable income is market income 
that is adjusted for direct taxes, social welfare benefits and tax credits.  Income-based measures 
can also make adjustments for major fixed costs such as housing, and for the size and 
composition of households.  Alternatively, deprivation-based measures look to measure the 
proportion of the population who cannot afford specific items that most people would regard 
as essential, such as shoes or a doctor’s visit.  These are known as “non-monetary indicators.” 
A list of these items is made, and a threshold set for the number of items a family will lack in 
order to be considered to be living in poverty.10 Deprivation measures arguably provide a more 
direct indication of poverty, because they reflect the standard of living actually achieved by a 
household.11  
The number of children living in poverty in New Zealand will vary depending on the 
poverty measure used, and where the thresholds are set for either measure. The EAG also 
acknowledged the difference between abject poverty (being deprived of absolute essentials for 
life) and the type of poverty New Zealand children live in, which is relative. Nevertheless, the 
EAG used both measures to examine the extent of child poverty in New Zealand. They also 
attempted to draw comparisons between New Zealand’s child poverty rate and the child 
poverty rates of other OECD countries.  
                                                             
8 Expert Advisory Group, above n 5, at 2. 
9 UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre Measuring Child Poverty: New league tables of child poverty in the 
world’s rich countries (Innocenti Report Card 10, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, Florence, 2012). 
10 Bryan Perry Household Incomes in New Zealand: Trends in Indicators of Inequality and Hardship 1982-2011 
(Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, 2012).  
11 Expert Advisory Group, above n 5, at 3.  
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The EAG report found that approximately 270,000 children, around one quarter of New 
Zealand’s child population, live in households where the disposable household income is below 
60 per cent of the median disposable household income. Current child poverty rates are 
approximately double the rates of the mid-1980s.  Children in New Zealand are consistently 
more likely to experience poverty than any other age group.12 The younger the child, the more 
likely that child is to be in poverty (largely due to parental incomes tending to be lower when 
children are young).13 Using deprivation-based measures, around 20 per cent of children 
experienced some form of significant material deprivation. This has increased from 
approximately 15 per cent in 2007.14  
The EAG noted that comparing child poverty rates across countries requires 
considerable care, because the relevant data is not always available or directly comparable. 
Moreover, any poverty measure which is based on some form of income threshold will not be 
particularly meaningful across countries given the variation of living standards and incomes. 
In these circumstances, non-monetary indicators of material deprivation are often more 
useful.15 Using a non-monetary indicator of material deprivation, New Zealand’s child material 
deprivation rates are higher than the majority of West European countries, but lower than 
Eastern European countries such as Hungary and Poland. As the EAG observes however, New 
Zealand’s rate of material deprivation for those aged 65 years and older is very low when 
compared with other countries. The EAG argues that this suggests New Zealand’s children 
need not be more deprived than the children of Western Europe; it demonstrates the potential 
for New Zealand to have much lower rates of child deprivation if it were made a policy 
priority.16  
What is clear as a result of the EAG’s work is that there are a significant number of 
children in New Zealand who are living in conditions which can be said to constitute relative 
poverty, regardless of the measure used. These children would benefit from a fuller realisation 
of their socio-economic rights. I now move to consider whether the idea of judicial enforcement 
of children’s socio-economic rights could be said to have any support in New Zealand’s recent 
constitutional review.  
                                                             
12 Expert Advisory Group, above n 5, at 4. 
13 Expert Advisory Group, above n 5, at 5. 
14 Perry, above n 10, at 181.  
15 Expert Advisory Group, above n 5, at 11. 
16 Expert Advisory Group, above n 5, at 11.  
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B The Constitution Conversation  
As a result of the 2008 general election in New Zealand, a coalition government between the 
National Party and the Māori Party was formed. The 2008 Relationship and Confidence and 
Supply Agreement between the National Party and the Māori Party included an agreement to 
establish a group to consider constitutional issues.17 A constitutional review was formally 
announced in December 2010, and in August 2011 twelve people were appointed to the 
Constitutional Advisory Panel (the Panel), to be chaired by Professor John Burrows QC and 
Sir Tipene O’Regan.18  
The Panel’s role was to “listen, facilitate and record New Zealanders’ views on 
constitutional issues.”19 Thus, between February and July 2013, a “Constitution Conversation” 
took place. The Panel held more than 100 meetings around New Zealand and received 5,259 
written submissions. Comments could also be made on the Constitution Conversation 
Facebook page. In December 2013 the Panel released its report.20 The major recommendation 
of the report was simply that the Government “invites and supports the people of Aotearoa 
New Zealand to continue the conversation about our constitutional arrangements.”21 However, 
the report is helpful for the purposes of this paper because it also provided an overview of the 
submissions the Panel received. One of the issues included in the review was the role of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the NZBORA). Thus conversation took place about 
rights in New Zealand, and the role that the State should play in upholding those rights.   
The Panel identified what it considered to be “common themes running through the 
Conversation.”22 These themes were “factors most people considered and balanced while 
developing their views on the topics.”23  I suggest that a number of these themes could be said 
to support the possibility of greater State accountability for upholding children’s rights and 
addressing child poverty.  
“Justice and fairness” was identified as a strong theme throughout the discussion. An 
element of this theme was that “achieving equality requires or allows the state to take active 
                                                             
17 National Party and Māori Party “Relationship and Confidence and Supply Agreement between the National 
Party and the Māori Party” (16 November 2008) at 2. 
18 Pita Sharples “Announcement of Constitutional Review” (press release, 8 December 2010), Bill English and 
Pita Sharples “Constitutional Advisory Panel Named” (press release, 4 August 2011). 
19 Constitutional Advisory Panel “The Panel” <www.ourconstitution.org.nz>. 
20 Constitutional Advisory Panel New Zealand’s Constitution: A Report on a Conversation (November 2013).  
21 Constitutional Advisory Panel, above n 20, at 8.  
22 Constitutional Advisory Panel, above n 20, at 11.  
23 Constitutional Advisory Panel, above n 20, at 11. 
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measures to achieve equality or prevent the perpetuation of existing injustices.”24 Another 
dimension of the justice and fairness theme was “the state’s role in ensuring people’s dignity 
and quality of life.”25  
Interestingly, under the thematic heading of “Checks and Balances”, the Panel 
identified that many of those contributing to the Conversation were surprised by, and expressed 
unease at, Parliament’s ability to pass laws which are contrary to the NZBORA. The Panel also 
noted that some people did not understand the concept of possible limitations on rights 
provided that those limitations are justifiable in a free and democratic society, that is, the 
permissible limitations on rights as per s 5 of the NZBORA.26  
The Panel observed that there was no significant support among the submitters for a 
supreme fully entrenched written constitution. In the Panel’s words, “support appears to lie, for 
now, with contested issues being decided in Parliament through the legislative process or other 
negotiated processes rather than by the courts.”27 Despite this, there was considerable support 
for entrenching elements of the constitution, specifically the NZBORA.28 The Panel itself gave 
a number of specific recommendations regarding the NZBORA. It recommended that the 
Government:29  
Sets up a process, with public consultation and participation, to explore in more detail 
the options for amending the Act [the NZBORA] to improve its effectiveness such as:  
 Adding economic, social and cultural rights, property rights and environmental 
rights 
 Improving compliance by the Executive and Parliament with the standards in 
the Act 
 Giving the Judiciary powers to assess legislation for consistency with the Act 
 Entrenching all or part of the Act 
A common theme in the Conversation around the NZBORA was the State’s role in 
fulfilling its citizens’ social, cultural and economic well-being. The proposed affirmation of 
social, cultural and economic rights in the NZBORA was seen by some submitters as a way of 
ensuring that decision-makers take account of these responsibilities. Submitters saw many 
                                                             
24 At 11. 
25 At 11. 
26 At 15.  
27 At 25. 
28 At 16.  
29 At 17. 
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reasons for adding social, cultural and economic rights to the NZBORA, including: 
guaranteeing access to high quality education, health care, food, housing and affordable energy; 
ensuring people receive an income that meets essential needs; and fulfilling the rights of 
children, including addressing child poverty.30 
The Panel also noted some discussion as to whether the NZBORA should be supreme 
law. In the context of this discussion, there was debate over what the most appropriate 
consequence would be for a law conflicting with the NZBORA. Three commonly proposed 
consequences were that the courts could strike down legislation, could require the Government 
to report to Parliament in response to a declaration of inconsistency (similar to the current 
process under the s 92J of the Human Rights Act 1993), or could strike down legislation but 
allow the legislation to stay in force for a limited time while Parliament addressed the 
inconsistency.31  
There was also a call from submitters for greater commitment to New Zealand’s 
international obligations, specifically the obligations under the ICESCR and the UNCRC. 
Submitters thought that New Zealand’s international obligations under these treaties would be 
better met by including those rights contained in the ICESCR and the UNCRC in the 
NZBORA.32 By contrast, one grouping of submitters suggested that adding any further rights 
to the NZBORA would overcomplicate it, that some rights would not have sufficiently 
widespread support and that the focus should remain on protecting and fulfilling the rights 
which are already recognised.33  
Overall, I suggest that the recent Constitution Conversation in New Zealand shows 
some support from New Zealanders for the incorporation of economic, social and cultural 
rights and even children’s rights into the NZBORA. The Conversation also demonstrated a 
level of interest from New Zealanders about the ability for the courts to strike down legislation 
inconsistent with the NZBORA. Thus it can be said that there is at least some interest in the 
concept of judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children in New Zealand. At the 
very least, the report recognises the possible role that socio-economic rights enforcement may 
play in addressing child poverty, and an acknowledgment of the State’s role in ensuring quality 
of life for New Zealand citizens.   
                                                             
30 Constitutional Advisory Panel, above n 20, at 50.  
31 At 55. 
32 At 53. 
33 At 53. 
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III Children’s Rights 
A Children’s capability to possess rights  
In examining the concept of judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children, it is 
necessary to briefly acknowledge that some theorists deny that children are capable of 
possessing rights. Wellman suggests that infants cannot possess rights at all, and that children’s 
rights gradually increase as children develop the capacities of a moral agent. This conclusion 
is based on his theory of rights in which the essential function of any right is “to confer 
autonomy, freedom and control…upon the right-holder.”34 He argues that a right must include 
at least one liberty and one power. The liberty permits the right-holder to act in a specific way, 
and the power gives the right-holder the ability to bring about a particular consequence as a 
result of an action. Only a being capable of acting in the morally relevant sense is capable of 
possessing a right. An infant cannot act as a moral agent, so cannot be a moral right-holder. As 
an infant develops the capacity to act morally, so he or she will gradually acquire moral rights.   
Infants have no moral duties; a baby does not have a moral duty to keep his or her 
clothes clean or to refrain from biting his or her mother’s breast. As a child grows and develops 
his or her capacities as a moral agent, so the child will gradually acquire moral obligations. 
Wellman argues that this should lead to an analogous thesis regarding children’s rights.35 For 
Wellman, it makes no sense to give someone a right until they have the ability to exercise the 
powers and liberties contained within it.36  
Using the example of the right to freedom of movement, Wellman identifies that 
children do not enjoy unrestricted freedom of movement. A child is free to go to his or her 
room to find a toy, or to refrain from attending the school dance, but he or she is not free to 
enter a bar or leave school during class time.37 A newborn does not need a right to freedom of 
movement because he or she cannot yet participate in any meaningful movement. Wellman 
sees the liberty within a right as a bilateral ethical liberty; that is, the right holder is free to 
choose to move, or not to move. Therefore, an awareness of the possibility of moving or not 
moving, and an ability to choose one option over the other, is necessary in order to possess the 
right.38 Clearly infants are not able to exercise psychological control, to make choices, or to act 
                                                             
34 Carl Wellman An Approach to Rights: Studies in the Philosophy of Law and Morals (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Dordrecht, 1997) at 17.  
35 At 17. 
36 At 127. 
37 Wellman, above n 34, at 128. 
38 At 128-129. 
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freely. Therefore Wellman argues that it is “both pointless and misleading” to ascribe rights to 
infants.39  
While this argument has legitimacy when considering children’s civil and political 
rights, it seems less applicable to children’s socio-economic rights. For example, the right to 
an adequate standard of living should not be something a child gradually acquires as he or she 
develops the capacity to exercise it; it is something that a child should possess from birth. 
Wellman’s answer to this is that a child does not possess a right to an adequate standard of 
living, but that others owe that child the duty to provide it. He rejects the notion that denying 
that children have rights must necessarily lead to the conclusion that child neglect and abuse 
are morally innocent. For Wellman, it is possible to have duties which are not based on rights. 
Thus it is possible that adults have moral duties regarding children, even if a child is not owed 
that duty as a result of some right which he or she possesses.40 While a newborn may not have 
the ability to possess the right to freedom of movement, the parent has a moral duty not to leave 
a newborn in his or her crib all day and night.41  
Wellman also one of the rights unique to children, that is, the right to enjoy special 
protection, as originally guaranteed under the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, and 
reaffirmed in the preamble of the UNCRC.42 He suggests that this right is a “claim-right”; when 
it is complete it consists of a set of ethical claims of the child against his or her parents, other 
individuals and the state. The parent has a moral duty to protect the child from malnutrition, 
physical injury, disease and so forth. These duties begin at birth and continue in varying degrees 
until the child becomes independent.  But Wellman argues that to say a parent has a particular 
duty regarding the child is not the same as saying that the child has an ethical claim against his 
or her parents. The child must possess some ability to make a claim. That is, the child must 
also have the ethical power to claim performance of the duty, or to claim a remedy for non-
performance.43  
Again, it is obvious that a newborn does not possess this power. Wellman posits that to 
make an ethical claim, one must also have some recognition of the duty being claimed, and an 
understanding of the relationship between the one owing to the duty and the one to whom the 
duty is owed. As Wellman writes, “Surely only after the child has had some experience of 
                                                             
39 At 17. 
40 At 17. 
41 At 132. 
42 Declaration of the Rights of the Child GA Res 1386, A/RES/1386(XIV) (1959).  
43 Wellman, above n 34, at 132-133. 
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moral obligations and personal relations can the child be meaningfully said to possess any 
ethical power of claiming from the parents their moral duty to provide special protection.”44  
Wellman’s argument is an interesting one. His theory regarding a child’s ability to make 
an ethical claim for performance of a duty, or for a remedy for non-performance, has 
implications for my later discussion regarding who may be responsible for bringing claims for 
socio-economic rights enforcement on behalf of children. However, the distinction he makes 
between children possessing rights and children being owed duties will have little practical 
implication for the proposal of judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children. Either 
the court will affirm a child’s possession of a right, or they will affirm the State’s duty towards 
that child, but the outcome of the decision will be the same regardless of characterisation.  
In Freeman’s words, “The case that children have rights has to a large extent been won: 
the burden now shifts to monitoring how well governments honour the pledges in their national 
laws and carry out their international obligations.”45 Thus I now move to consider New 
Zealand’s international obligations towards children.  
B International Obligations  
New Zealand’s children have rights at international law, as recognised by both the 
UNCRC and the ICESCR. New Zealand became a signatory to the ICESCR in 1966 and the 
UNCRC in 1990, and ratified these treaties in 1978 and 1993 respectively.  The UNCRC has 
been ratified by every member of the United Nations except Somalia and the United States of 
America, making it the most widely supported international human rights treaty.  
The ICESCR, which has been ratified by 162 nations, contains socio-economic rights 
which apply to everyone, not just children. However, it also contains provisions which relate 
specifically to children: article 10(3) protects children from economic and social exploitation, 
and article 12(2)(a) provides for the healthy development of the child.  
The socio-economic rights guaranteed to children by the UNCRC include the right to 
survival and development (Article 6), the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health 
(Article 24), the right to benefit from social security (Article 26), the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development 
                                                             
44 At 133. 
45 Michael D A Freeman “The Limits of Children’s Rights” in Michael Freeman and Philip Veerman (eds) The 
Ideologies of Children’s Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1992) at 42.  
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(Article 27), and the right to education (Articles 28 and 29). These are characterised by 
Lansdown as the “provision rights” of the UNCRC.46  
Article 4 of the UNCRC provides that “States Parties shall undertake all appropriate 
legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognised 
in the present Convention.” Notably, the obligation on States Parties with regard to the socio-
economic rights contained in the UNCRC is that States Parties shall “undertake such measures 
to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework 
of international co-operation.”47 The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (the 
Committee) has stated that Article 4 introduces the concept of the “progressive realisation” of 
children’s socio-economic rights.48  
The UNCRC recognises that the primary responsibility for the upbringing and 
development of the child lies with that child’s parents or legal guardians.49 However, it also 
specifies that the States Parties shall “render appropriate assistance to parents and legal 
guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the 
development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children.”50 Further 
discussion of the role of parents and of the state in fulfilling children’s socio-economic rights 
will take place later in the paper. For now, it is sufficient to say that the result of New Zealand’s 
ratification of the UNCRC is that the New Zealand government assumes some form of 
obligation towards the fulfilment of the socio-economic rights of its children.  
The EAG consulted almost 300 children living predominantly in low socio-economic 
areas as part of their report. It is interesting to note that in this consultation, the main themes 
children and young people identified as important to them were: housing, family, education, 
health, and social, leisure and cultural activities.51 There is significant overlap between the 
themes identified by these children and the socio-economic rights provided for in the UNCRC.  
New Zealand’s ratification of the UNCRC did not result in the socio-economic rights 
it contains being incorporated directly into New Zealand legislation. The NZBORA does not 
                                                             
46 Gerison Lansdown “Children’s Rights” in Berry Mayall (ed) Children’s Childhood: Observed and 
Experienced (Falmer Press, London, 1994) at 33-34.  
47 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 
1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) art 4.  
48 Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 5: General Measures of Implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC/GC/2003/5 (2003) at [7].  
49 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art 18(1). 
50 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art 18(2).  
51 Expert Advisory Group, above n 5, at 22. 
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contain any socio-economic rights, let alone rights specific to children.52 Some commentators 
such as Ludbrook have argued that New Zealand has taken its international obligations towards 
children too lightly, failing to implement the UNCRC in any meaningful way.53 Ludbrook goes 
so far as to call New Zealand’s ratification of the UNCRC “a false promise to the nation’s 
children.”54 There is certainly more that could be done to ensure New Zealand fulfils the 
obligations it assumed as a result of ratification.  
Under Article 44 of the UNCRC, New Zealand is obligated to submit a report on the 
measures it has adopted which give effect to the rights recognised in the UNCRC and on the 
progress made on the enjoyment of those rights. Such a report must be submitted to the 
Committee two years after ratification, and subsequently every five years.55 The Committee 
considered New Zealand’s last report in January 2011, and offered its concluding observations 
in February of the same year.56  
The Committee noted with appreciation an increase in New Zealand’s expenditure on 
children in recent years. They also acknowledged the efforts of the Working for Families tax 
credit initiative in its attempts to reduce poverty. However, the Committee remained concerned 
that such efforts were “not sufficient to eradicate poverty and address inequalities.”57 There 
were also concerns noted in relation to the general standard of living for children in New 
Zealand:58 
The Committee notes with appreciation the efforts undertaken by the State party to 
improve the standard of living. However, the Committee, while noting that the extent 
of child poverty has declined in recent years, is nonetheless concerned that still about 
20 percent of children in the State party are living under the poverty line. 
Thus child poverty in New Zealand has been noted as an area of concern by the Committee, 
and an area in which New Zealand could better fulfil its obligations to children under the 
UNCRC.  The Committee has also articulated in its General Comment on General Measures 
of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child that “For rights to have 
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meaning, effective remedies must be available to redress violations…” The Committee has 
emphasised that socio-economic rights must be regarded as justiciable, and that domestic 
legislation must articulate children’s entitlements in sufficient detail, to enable effective 
remedies for non-compliance with these entitlements.59  Thus there is a strong directive from 
the Committee that judicial enforcement of children’s socio-economic rights would enable 
New Zealand to better meet its international obligations.  
IV A unique category of rights-holders  
This paper specifically explores the possibility of judicially enforceable socio-economic rights 
for children. There is now a burgeoning academic literature on children’s rights, largely as a 
result of the adoption of the UNCRC. Many academics have identified reasons why children’s 
socio-economic rights are particularly important, and arguably in need of judicial protection.   
At international law and in New Zealand domestic law, children have the same basic 
human rights as adults.60 However, children in New Zealand are not necessarily able to exercise 
all their rights in the same way as adults. They also have additional rights which are unique to 
them, such as the right to know and be cared for by parents, and the right to rest, leisure and 
play.61  The UNCRC also recognises children’s need for special protection; “The child, by 
reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including 
appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.”62  
There are three main arguments to be made to justify the justiciability of socio-
economic rights for children in particular. The first is that children are disproportionately 
affected by socio-economic rights violations. The second is that children have a limited ability 
to fulfil their own socio-economic rights. The third is that children cannot exercise many civil 
and political rights.  More specifically, the fact that children do not possess the right to vote 
can have important implications for how well their socio-economic rights are protected by the 
state. I address each of these arguments in turn.  
A Children are disproportionately affected by socio-economic rights violations 
The realisation of socio-economic rights is inherently more important for children than for 
adults, in that a child will often suffer greater harm if that child is deprived of any one of his or 
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her socio-economic rights. As Leary comments, while civil and political rights become 
increasingly important as a child ages, “economic and social rights are of critical importance 
to infants and children from the youngest age.”63 The fulfilment of basic socio-economic rights 
is vitally connected to a child’s mental and physical development. As a result of children being 
less mentally and physically developed than adults, they are likely to be more significantly 
affected by a socio-economic rights violation than an adult who suffers that same rights 
violation. This can be illustrated by the example of a violation of an individual’s right to food.  
A man who is deprived of food for a period of time will suffer hardship. He will feel 
hungry, and experience any number of symptoms associated with food deprivation. But once 
the violation ceases, that is, once the man has sufficient food again, he is likely to recover 
quickly and to continue to live in a largely normal manner. On the other hand, a young boy 
deprived of his right to food for the same length of time is likely to experience a significantly 
greater negative effect as a result of such deprivation. Given that the boy is still developing, 
both mentally and physically, he may suffer lower resistance to illness in the short term for 
example, and poor physical and mental development in the long term.64  Thus the same socio-
economic rights violation has a disproportionate effect on the boy because of his age.  
Similarly, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate 
Housing has emphasised the link between children’s housing rights and their cognit ive, 
physical, cultural, emotional and social development, stressing that children are 
“disproportionately vulnerable to the negative effects of inadequate and insecure living 
conditions.”65 His observations were that children suffer disproportionately as a result of losing 
their homes because they lose psychological shelter and security, which affects children in both 
short term and long term ways, and does so more significantly than it affects adults.66  
I argue that there is justification for the prioritisation of children’s socio-economic 
rights realisation over adults, because of the disproportionate effect of socio-economic rights 
violation on children.   
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B Children have a limited ability to fulfil their own socio-economic rights  
A second reason for special protection of children’s socio-economic rights in particular is that 
children are limited in their ability to fulfil their own socio-economic rights. The New Zealand 
Human Rights Commission sees children as autonomous rights holders, but acknowledges that 
they are dependent on others to give effect to their rights.67 Similarly, Wringe emphasises the 
child’s lack of ability to provide for him or herself. He argues that an adult, by virtue of his or 
her acquisition of knowledge and skills in reaching adulthood, and his or her physical strength, 
is able to “obtain or create sustenance from the resources of his environment.”68 Sometimes 
adults will not be able to do this, because they have suffered an injury, or because a change in 
external conditions mean that the survival skills that adult possesses are rendered useless. This 
is where an adult’s right to social security becomes important; the right to social security 
provides for an adult when a contingency has impaired that adult’s ability to provide for him 
or herself.  
Wringe asserts that where an adult cannot survive by obtaining sustenance directly from 
his or her environment, he or she generally has the ability to work to earn a living.69 An adult 
has knowledge of the needs of others and of prevailing social practices, enabling him or her to 
drive a bargain in order to survive. Article 6 of the ICESCR recognises the right to work, which 
includes “the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely 
chooses or accepts.” ICESCR rights apply to everyone including children, but this does not 
necessarily mean that children have the ability to work, nor that they should work. As Wringe 
argues, a child does not possess the same knowledge, skills or physical strength as an adult, 
which means a child is less able to provide for him or herself from the surrounding 
environment. Even if a child can work to survive, as does the child whose fingers roll cigarettes 
or sew buttons in a sweatshop, there is a general social consensus that a child should not have 
to work to support him or herself.  Clearly these expectations change as a child grows older; 
Wellman would say that while a baby has no ability to provide for his or her own socio-
economic rights, the same cannot be said of the seventeen year old. Nevertheless, it is true that 
to some extent, children in New Zealand have a more limited ability to fulfil their own socio-
economic rights than adults do. This can be said to provide a justification for judicially 
enforceable socio-economic rights for children in particular.  
                                                             
67 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at 239.  
68 C A Wringe Children’s Rights: A Philosophical Study (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981) at 136. 
69 Wringe, above n 68, at 136.  
Judicial Enforcement of Children’s Socio-Economic Rights: Possible Effects on Child Poverty in New Zealand 
19 
 
C Children have limited civil and political rights  
The final argument for guaranteeing children’s socio-economic rights by judicial enforcement 
is that children cannot exercise a number of the civil and political rights that adults can. This 
is not necessarily a formal or legal deprivation of rights, but an acceptance that children’s civil 
and political rights are justifiably limited by those who care for and take responsibility for 
them. As Austin writes, “To accept that confining an adolescent to his or her room is not a 
matter for habeas corpus relief… is to accept that there are differences between private and 
public regulation of children’s lives.”70 New Zealand’s children do have the right to freedom 
of movement as guaranteed by s 18 of the NZBORA. Yet, society accepts a parent’s limiting 
of their child’s freedom of movement to a certain extent. New Zealand’s children have the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief under s 13 of the NZBORA, but in 
reality this right is limited for children because society accepts that parents can instruct their 
children in religious belief for example.  
Moreover, to draw on Wellman’s theory of children’s rights, while children legally 
possess most civil and political rights, often they are simply incapable of exercising them. 
While children in New Zealand are guaranteed the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under 
s 16 of the NZBORA, they are not necessarily physically able to assemble where and with 
whom they would like.   
However, a right which children are formally deprived of, and one which arguably has 
a significant impact on children’s ability to guarantee fulfilment of their own socio-economic 
rights, is the right to vote. Under s 12 of the NZBORA, the right to vote is limited to those 
citizens who are of or over the age of eighteen years; New Zealand children do not possess the 
right to vote. There are more than a million children in New Zealand in a total population of 
just over 4.5 million. Thus almost a quarter of New Zealand’s population has no say in the 
democratic process.  
Boston and Chapple identify the disenfranchisement of children as one of the main 
reasons to explain why policy-makers in New Zealand “have taken only limited measures to 
address child poverty for over two decades.”71 They acknowledge that while parents do have 
votes and are “very directly concerned with their children’s best interests,” an adult vote of a 
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parent has the same weighting as an adult vote of someone without dependent children.72 They 
also identify that participation in the democratic process can be more difficult for parents than 
those without dependent children, and this can be particularly true for poor parents. Moreover, 
a continually aging population means that the number of voters without dependent children 
will continue to grow, increasing the “democratic challenge” of under-represented children.  
There are some who argue that children as citizens should have the same civil and 
political rights as adults, including the right to vote. There are many under the age of eighteen 
who are able to make reasoned decisions about who to vote for on the basis of well-informed 
political views. Despite these arguments gaining traction in various democracies, the lowest 
voting age remains at sixteen years.73 Boston and Chapple are doubtful about the impact that 
lowering the voting age would have on child poverty in New Zealand. They point to probable 
low voter turnout among children and the fact that younger voters will not necessarily place a 
higher priority on reducing child poverty than older voters would.74  
Depriving children of the right to vote provides justification for greater protection of 
their socio-economic rights. One way to do this is to give these rights judicial protection. Adults 
who have the right to vote are in a better position to ensure their socio-economic rights are 
fulfilled by the state; they have the ability to vote for the government who they believe will 
best fulfil those rights for them. Children cannot vote for the government which they believe 
will best uphold their socio-economic rights. Nor are governments accountable to children if 
they fail to respect, protect and fulfil children’s socio-economic rights.  Governments are faced 
with many competing demands, and children are unlikely to be the highest priority.  
In the words of Thomas Hammarberg, one of ten experts elected to the Committee in 
1991: 75 
Children have always been, and still are, the victims of hypocrisy. Politicians often pay 
lip service to the well-being of children, many of them are eager to be seen as child 
friendly. But in real terms when economy and other interests come into the picture, 
children tend to be let down.  
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The Children’s Commissioner described the position of New Zealand’s children in 
similar terms. “Children and their interests are relatively invisible in public affairs in New 
Zealand and little priority is given to them, or their rights and interests, by decision-makers. 
For example, children have remained the group in our society most likely to be living in 
hardship or income poverty, a circumstance that has persisted for twenty years through times 
of growth and of recession.”76 
Closely related to the disenfranchisement of children, Boston and Chapple identify a 
further reason for what they call the “policy neglect” of child poverty in New Zealand. Put 
simply, it will be expensive to provide policy solutions in the short term, and the benefits of 
reducing child poverty are “much less readily observed and many of them will occur only in 
the distant future.”77 They compare child poverty with environmental problems, in that both 
issues require a long term outlook and short term fiscal sacrifices, and thus neither issue is 
particularly well dealt with by the New Zealand political system. The Children’s Commissioner 
has also criticised New Zealand’s political processes as “not well suited to taking children’s 
interests into account.”78 Governments are unlikely to spend large amounts of money on 
policies to better fulfil children’s socio-economic rights when the beneficiaries of those policies 
will have no role in voting that government into power at the next election. This is an important 
argument for why the non-elected judiciary should play a role in guaranteeing the fulfilment of 
children’s socio-economic rights in New Zealand.  
D The appropriateness of double standards  
In considering the justifications for judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights for children 
in particular, it is important to recognise that some argue there is no justification for treating 
children differently at all. Some such as Freeman have challenged the understanding that it is 
appropriate to have double standards for the rights guaranteed to children and those guaranteed 
to adults. He argues that a double standard is appropriate when the distinction upon which it 
relies is morally relevant; thus he suggests that it is not justifiable to give one person the right 
to vote and not the other based solely on the colour of their skin for example. But he challenges 
the validity of age as a distinction on which to base differences in rights.79  
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In order to give children some rights and not others, we must draw a line at which point 
a child becomes an adult. Most countries draw this line at age eighteen years. Freeman then 
points out that there is clearly no real distinction between an eighteen year old and someone 
who is seventeen years and 364 days old. Any line which is drawn by law will necessarily be 
arbitrary. There will be those on either side of the line who meet the criteria considered 
necessary to be granted that right. Consider the earlier example of the right to vote. Skin colour 
is not considered a valid distinction on which to base a double standard, but age is. The 
argument is that children do not yet possess the necessary competence to exercise the full rights 
of citizenship by making informed political choices. Therefore children are denied the right to 
vote. But as Freeman points out, there are many adults who arguably would not meet this 
competence test either. In his words, “Look at the governments voted in by adults in Britain, 
the United States, Israel in recent years!”80 Freeman’s argument is essentially that it is not 
difficult to undermine the arguments put forward to justify the distinction between children and 
adults in their ability to exercise their rights.   
However, Freeman does not go so far as to suggest that there should not be differences 
between the rights of children and adults. He recognises that there is still a need for some 
distinction, especially on the basis of children’s need for special protection. But Freeman 
argues for a middle ground: “to take children’s rights seriously requires us to take seriously 
both protection of children and recognition of their autonomy.”81 Freeman would interfere with 
children’s autonomy only to the extent necessary to prevent their exploitation. He posits 
limitations on children’s rights on the basis of “future-oriented consent”. That is, we should 
ask of any distinction, “Looking back, would the child appreciate and accept the reason for the 
restriction imposed upon him or her, given what he or she now knows as a rationally 
autonomous adult?”82  
While it is important to remember to challenge the distinctions on which double 
standards are based, there are still good justifications for taking different approaches towards 
the protection of rights of children, as Freeman acknowledges. The reasons I have outlined 
above provide justification for the judicial enforcement of children’s socio-economic rights, 
even if the same is not to be guaranteed for adults.  
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V Judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children generally 
This Part explores how judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children might work 
in general.  I begin with an introduction to the duties contained with socio-economic rights, 
and ways in which these duties can be enforced by the courts. I consider the tension between 
the duties of the parent and the state, and then move to a discussion of the remedies available 
for socio-economic rights enforcement. Finally I briefly address some of the risks posed by 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights.  
A Duties Contained Within Socio-Economic Rights 
Traditionally, distinctions have been made between negative and positive rights, which are also 
known as first and second generation rights. Civil and political rights are considered negative 
or “first generation” rights. They are negative in the sense that they protect individuals from 
certain interferences by the state. Socio-economic rights are considered positive or “second 
generation” rights, because they impose a positive duty on behalf of the state to provide them.  
The validity of this distinction has been rightfully challenged. Henry Shue identifies 
three correlative duties contained in every right, whether the right is considered negative or 
positive. Every right contains a duty to avoid depriving an individual of the right, a duty to 
protect the individual from deprivation and a duty to aid the deprived individual.83 Davis 
employs the example of the right to adequate food. Within this right there are three duties: the 
duty not to eliminate an individual’s only available means of acquiring food, the duty to protect 
an individual from having their only food source eliminated, and the duty to provide food for 
those who cannot provide it for themselves. In this way, a socio-economic right, which is 
traditionally seen as a positive right, can be seen to contain both negative and positive 
obligations.84  
B Calling Upon the Courts  
In her study of judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights for children, Nolan helpfully 
identifies the three categories in which the courts may be asked to intervene to secure 
enforcement of these rights. These categories correspond with the three correlative duties Shue 
recognises as being contained in any right. The first category is where the government has itself 
interfered with children’s enjoyment of their socio-economic rights; the government has failed 
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to respect children’s rights. The second category is where the government has failed to prevent 
a third party from interfering with children’s enjoyment of their socio-economic rights; the 
government has failed to protect these rights.  The final incidence is where the government has 
failed to take positive steps to facilitate, promote or provide children’s socio-economic rights; 
the government has failed to satisfy its obligation to fulfil the socio-economic rights of its 
children.  
Of course, it will not always be clear which of these categories the court is addressing. 
There are situations where the difference between the court addressing an alleged failure to 
protect a right and an alleged failure to fulfil a positive obligation may depend on the way the 
claim is phrased or argued.  Often a socio-economic rights violation will involve more than 
one of these incidences.  
Judicial intervention in the first category of cases is likely to be the least controversial, 
as the If the court is called to intervene in the first category, as the court will be called to halt 
the interference, rather than prescribe a positive measure to be taken by the state to enable 
vindication of the right. New Zealand’s relatively positive human rights record means it is 
difficult to imagine New Zealand’s government interfering with children’s socio-economic 
rights in this direct way. New Zealand’s children are not often at risk of forced eviction from 
their homes at the hands of the government, as some Roma children are in Italy and France, for 
example.85  
The second category would require the courts to outline positive steps which the 
government must take to stop a third party from interfering with a child’s enjoyment of his or 
her socio-economic rights. In similarity with the first category however, the court’s aim is 
arguably to return the situation to the status quo, that is, to halt a rights violation which is 
occurring as a result of third party interference. Again, it is easy to look to extreme examples 
which would fall into this category: the Iraqi government’s failure to protect Yazidi minority 
children’s socio-economic right to food, currently being violated by Islamic State fighters, for 
example.86  
However, there are much more commonplace situations in New Zealand, where 
children could bring claims against the government for failing to protect them from socio-
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economic rights violations by third parties. While New Zealand children may not be at risk of 
the government evicting them from their homes, they may be at risk of landlords doing so.  A 
quarter of New Zealand’s children are living in some form of poverty, being deprived of their 
socio-economic rights to adequate food, shelter, and healthcare. Sometimes this deprivation is 
at the hands of their parents. It is in these less extreme, more everyday situations, that 
characterisations such as Nolan’s “retaining the status quo” become less helpful.   
When a landlord evicts a family with children because the parents cannot pay the rent, 
that landlord can be characterised as a third party who is violating those children’s right to 
adequate housing. When a New Zealand parent purchases cigarettes for him or herself before 
purchasing bread and milk for his or her children, that parent is a third party who is interfering 
with his or her children’s right to food. In this case, the required outcome from the courts would 
be to outline positive steps which the government must take in order to halt the third party’s 
interference with the enjoyment of the right. But in these situations, socio-economic rights 
enforcement is unlikely to be an order to retain or re-establish the status quo; it is more likely 
to require the government to step in and provide for the realisation of the right.  
There is something inherently difficult about the situation in which the person violating 
the socio-economic right has a duty not just to respect, but also to fulfil that right. Is it 
appropriate to require the government to protect children from socio-economic rights violations 
at the hands of their parents, when their parents owe their children a duty to fulfil their rights?  
Intuitively, it seems less controversial for the courts to outline positive steps for 
governments to take to protect children from socio-economic rights violations in the form of 
being deprived of their right to food by Islamic State soldiers, than by their own parents. The 
Islamic State fighter owes a duty to respect the child’s socio-economic rights, that is, not to 
actively violate them. But he does not have a duty to fulfil the socio-economic rights of the 
child.  The parent, on the other hand, has a duty to respect and to fulfil his or her child’s socio-
economic rights. Thus when the court outlines positive steps for the government to take in 
order to protect children’s rights from being infringed by their parents, the court is telling the 
government to implement a policy to force parents to fulfil their duties, or to fulfil the parents’ 
duties for them.  
I return to the categories in which the courts may intervene to secure enforcement of 
children’s socio-economic rights. The third category is when the government fails to satisfy its 
obligation to fulfil the socio-economic rights of children. In this situation, Nolan suggests that 
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the courts’ role will become more controversial, as they will be required to alter the status quo, 
which will more often than not require an adjustment of resource distribution. Again, this is a 
situation in which both the government and the parents of the child have a duty to fulfil 
children’s socio-economic rights.  
C Duties of Parents and the State 
The above discussion demonstrates that at the heart of the issue of socio-economic rights 
enforceability for children is a difficult question: who owes children what Wellman would call 
“moral duties”? Instinctively, we know that parents owe their children moral duties to fulfil 
their socio-economic rights. Indeed, this is confirmed by the UNCRC’s approach to the duties 
of parents. In Article 3(2), States agree to ensure the child such protection and care as is 
necessary for his or her well-being, but they do so “taking into account the rights and duties of 
his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him and her.” 
States must also respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents, legal guardians or 
other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the 
evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child 
of the rights recognised in the UNCRC.87 The UNCRC also recognises the role of “members 
of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom” in the provision of this 
direction and guidance, which would cover situations such as whangai children in New Zealand 
(that is, children looked after by those who are not their birth parents, in accordance with 
tikanga Māori).  
Article 18 of the UNCRC sets out the role of parents and of the state in ensuring 
children’s enjoyments of their rights. It provides firstly that:  
States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both 
parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of their child. 
Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the 
upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their 
basic concern.  
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Thus the primary responsibility for upbringing and development rests with the parents. 
However, Article 18 goes on to state that, for the purposes of guaranteeing and promoting the 
rights in the Convention: 
States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the 
performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development of 
institutions, facilities and services for the care of children. 
The primary responsibility of the parents is again recognised in Article 27, where 
parents are to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living 
necessary for the child’s development. Again, States Parties are to take appropriate measures 
to assist parents to implement this right, and, in case of need, provide material assistance and 
support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.88  However, 
States are only required to do so “in accordance with national conditions and within their 
means.”  
Of course, parents and families will not always fulfil their duties to realise their 
children’s socio-economic rights. As Nolan writes, “the presumption that relationships within 
the family are necessarily underpinned by principles of social justice ignores the fact that the 
family is neither exempt from, nor unaffected by, the attitudes and practices of society.”89 She 
argues that the family is simply a social institution which will reflect social norms that are 
“adultist, gendered, racialised and heterosexist.”90 She also notes that there are many children 
who do not live with family or carers, who may be harmed by the presumption that the family 
will provide for a child’s socio-economic needs.91 
There will always be a tension between the role of parents and of the role of the state 
in socio-economic rights fulfilment. The UNCRC model is that parents have the primary 
responsibility, but that states are to assist. The UNCRC also presumes that the best interests of 
the child will be parents’ primary concern. Of course, there are many situations when parents 
fail to make their children’s best interests their primary concern. There are also many situations 
where parents are genuinely unable to fulfil their duties towards their children. Children’s 
socio-economic rights are vital to their development and indeed to their meaningful 
participation in society. Therefore I suggest that while the primary responsibility for socio-
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economic rights fulfilment should always rest with parents, when parents fail to fulfil their 
duties towards their children, it is the state’s responsibility to recognise its international 
obligations and work towards children’s socio-economic rights realisation in accordance with 
national conditions and within their means.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
E Remedies  
Landau identifies four possible approaches to remedies which are available to courts in the 
exercise of socio-economic rights enforcement. He examines how effective each approach is 
likely to be in terms of creating change in state practice, and who the likely beneficiaries of 
each approach will be.  Landau’s work is particularly helpful when considering the impact that 
judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children may have on child poverty in New 
Zealand, because any impact is likely to depend on the effectiveness of the remedy, and 
whether or not the remedies will reach those in poverty.  
The first approach is individualised rights enforcement. In this situation, an individual 
plaintiff would bring a claim to the court asking for enforcement of their right. The typical 
example is an ill plaintiff who brings a claim to the court for a particular medical procedure, 
based on his or her right to health. This form of socio-economic rights enforcement is very 
popular with courts because it means that they do not appear to be intervening in any significant 
way with public policy. Of course, the downside to this approach is that it has very little effect 
on government behaviour.  Even if a court recognises that a single plaintiff is entitled to a 
remedy based on the fact that his or her socio-economic right is being infringed by a particular 
law or policy, there is little incentive for the government to change that law or policy.92  
Moreover, as Brinks and Gauri identify, the individualised form of remedy tends to 
benefit middle and upper-class groups overall, as they are the ones who can afford to litigate. 
Even if this remedy is made as accessible as possible, Landau argues that it is still likely to 
benefit the rich over the poor. He gives the example of the tutela in Colombia, which was a 
device created by the 1991 Colombian Constitution. A tutela is a constitutional complaint 
allowing citizens harmed by government actions in violation of their constitutional rights to 
bring suit.93 The device was designed to be fast, informal, and inexpensive. The tutelas were 
well used, but when a study was undertaken by the Procuraduria (akin to a Colombian 
Attorney-General) as to who was using the tutelas, it was found that their use was strongly 
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concentrated among the middle and upper-class, and not the poor.94 Those groups were much 
more likely to know their rights, so naturally filed the bulk of the tutelas.  
Similarly, the Indian Supreme Court attempted to increase its accessibility by actively 
encouraging public interest lawsuits. Justice Bhagwati chaired a Committee for Implementing 
Legal Aid Schemes which aimed to provide the Indian citizenry with the means to claim their 
constitutional rights in the courts.95 The Court loosened standing requirements, ruling that “any 
member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for 
public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the 
Constitution or the law.”96  Justice Bhagwati also began turning newspaper articles and letters 
to the Court into writ petitions for rights enforcement, under Article 32 of the Indian 
Constitution. Despite all this, the evidence was that there was no significant increase in 
litigation by lower-class groups.97 
Brinks and Gauri also identify that judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights may 
have a regressive effect on the distribution of public goods in the form of “beneficiary 
inequality.” This denotes the possibility of courts determining who will benefit from policies 
which are meant to be universal, but are in practice only accessible to those who can afford to 
litigate for realisation of the policy.98 Their evidence suggests that in countries like Brazil, 
where judicial enforcement of rights is done largely through individual cases and with the 
awarding of narrow remedies, there seems to be a greater risk of beneficiary inequality.   
The second approach to remedies is the negative injunction. This is where the courts 
issue an order striking down a law or policy which would withdraw an existing benefit. This is 
seen as a less controversial method because it means the courts are simply maintaining the 
status quo. They are not making complex budgetary allocations or constructing policy; they are 
simply preventing the State from putting a policy into effect. The negative injunction method 
is closely related to the non-retrogression principle created by the United Nations Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The principle states that any deliberately 
retrogressive measures relating to existing social benefits “require the most careful 
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consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference of the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available 
resources.”99  
Landau suggests that this negative injunction remedy will also favour more affluent 
groups, because it is the middle and upper class groups who tend to have pensions, health care 
and other subsidies, and it is these benefits which are most at risk of being reduced when 
governments need to cut budget deficits.  Landau suggests that the poor do not have many 
benefits for the government to remove, so states are less likely to target these benefits in times 
of recession or structural adjustment. I also suggest that the negative injunction model could 
provide a disincentive for governments to pass legislation and implement policies which fulfil 
socio-economic rights if they know they will find it difficult to repeal or remove them.  
The third approach is what Tushnet has called “weak form review.”100 This approach 
describes the approach of the South African Constitutional Court in the famous decision of 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom in 2000. The Court’s approach in 
this case was to find that the political branches of South Africa had violated the constitutional 
right to adequate housing. However, instead of granting an individual remedy, the Court simply 
stated that the State had an obligation to “devise and implement a coherent, coordinated 
programme” and reserve a “reasonable” part of its total housing budget to provide housing for 
those who were in desperate need.101 Tushnet’s characterisation of this decision was that it 
allowed the Court to judicially enforce the socio-economic right without encroaching on the 
prerogative of the legislative or executive branches of government.  
Landau argues, however, that weak form review is not an effective way to judicially 
enforce socio-economic rights. In the particular case of Grootboom, the plan the Court 
requested was never produced, and many agree that the decision in the case has had no real 
effect on the realisation of the right to housing in South Africa.102   
The fourth approach is the one which Landau argues is the most likely to bring about 
real change in bureaucratic practice, and therefore offers the possible realisation of socio-
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economic rights for the poor. He calls this approach “structural enforcement”, where, instead 
of issuing an individualised remedy to a particular plaintiff, the court issues structural orders 
to the government requiring it to change a policy in a particular area. The court can also 
maintain a supervisory jurisdiction over the case to ensure its orders are carried out.103 For 
example, the Colombian Constitutional Court has twice issued “state of unconstitutional 
affairs” orders, in which they issued detailed orders to the government, instructing the 
government as to how they should address displaced persons and healthcare. Landau argues 
that these interventions by the courts have allowed them to target remedies towards lower class 
groups rather than the middle and upper classes, and have resulted in real changes in policy. 
The extent to which those policy changes have resulted in better socio-economic rights 
outcomes for the poor is still the topic of much debate.  
Landau argues that the controversial nature of courts enforcing socio-economic rights 
by outlining positive steps for governments to take, in some cases going so far as to order the 
redistribution of resources or the creation of new programmes, means that courts are more 
likely in practice to enforce socio-economic rights by issuing negative injunctions or giving 
individualised remedies to individual plaintiffs. In his words, “such methods of enforcement 
will be least likely to get courts into serious trouble.”104 However, these methods are also likely 
to be less effective at changing government practice, and they are less likely to benefit those 
who most require judicial protection of their socio-economic rights, that is, the poor.  
Landau’s work suggests that the effectiveness of judicial enforcement of socio-
economic rights depends very much on the way the courts choose to enforce these rights. The 
more willing the court is to outline particular steps that a government must take, the more likely 
there is to be significant change in government policy.  
Brinks and Gauri argue that there is no conclusive evidence of the overall effect of 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights on the way that public goods are distributed in 
a society. They suggest that there is also little evidence of the “deeply marginalised” benefiting 
from judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights, at least in the developing world. Brinks 
and Gauri argue that it is very difficult to find empirical evidence to support the proposition 
that judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights leads to a more just society than if those 
rights had been left to be enforced by majoritarian institutions such as parliaments. It is difficult 
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to show that more people have better access to higher quality health care in India for example, 
simply on the basis that India has given its courts the ability to enforce socio-economic rights 
rather than observing strict parliamentary supremacy.105  
While it is true that it is difficult to produce empirical evidence to support any claim to 
better protection of socio-economic rights by judicial enforcement than by majoritarian 
institutions, in the case of children’s socio-economic rights it is significant that children have 
no part to play in electing the majoritarian institutions. Therefore it is certainly arguable that 
for children specifically, the judiciary are in a better position to protect their socio-economic 
rights than a majoritarian institution is.  
F Risks of judicial enforcement  
Brinks and Gauri identify that a possible risk of socio-economic rights enforcement by the 
courts is the creation of “policy area inequality.” Assuming that only those who can afford to 
litigate will take cases to the courts, this could have the unintended effect of focusing the 
government’s attention on issues that are important to the wealthy, rather than the poor. That 
is to say that courts would effectively end up “shaping the overall policy offering of the state” 
to disproportionately benefit those who can afford to litigate their rights.106  
Nolan also identifies possible negative indirect effects of judicial enforcement of 
children’s socio-economic rights. She suggests that a controversial judicial decision may 
provoke a knee-jerk law change so as to reverse the effects of the ruling.  The ability of the 
New Zealand legislature to pass laws quickly in response to unpopular judicial decisions was 
clearly demonstrated in the immediate aftermath of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ngati 
Apa v Attorney-General in 2003 and the subsequent Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. Thus 
Nolan’s concern about quick legislative overriding of judicial decisions may be particularly 
relevant in the New Zealand context.  
Nolan also identifies the risk that to give the courts the ability to enforce children’s 
socio-economic rights may lead to a sense of apathy by the elected branches of government. If 
the courts are remedying the problem, perhaps there is no need for the executive or legislature 
to do so. As I have argued earlier however, there is already a degree of political apathy towards 
child poverty as a result of the disenfranchisement of children and the need for long term 
solutions which will be expensive to implement in the short term.  Nolan’s concern about 
                                                             
105 Brinks and Gauri, above n 98, at 336. 
106 Brinks and Gauri, above n 98, at 335. 
Judicial Enforcement of Children’s Socio-Economic Rights: Possible Effects on Child Poverty in New Zealand 
33 
 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights creating a sense of apathy is arguably less 
relevant in the New Zealand context.  
VI Judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children in New Zealand 
Having canvassed some of the ways in which socio-economic rights can be enforced, I now 
seek to evaluate the effect that judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children might 
have on child poverty in New Zealand. One of the difficulties of this task is the fact that socio-
economic rights jurisprudence, much like comparative poverty measures, is “inevitably 
embedded in particular cultures and contexts that may not ‘translate’ to other jurisdictions.”107 
However, it is possible to identify some of the factors which impact the effectiveness of socio-
economic rights adjudication and to apply those to the New Zealand context.  
The following discussion is based on the presumption that the remedy which the courts 
provide is implemented by the government. That is, I presume that if the courts issue a negative 
injunction against a government policy, that policy is not implemented, or if a structural 
enforcement remedy is issued, it is complied with. Clearly this is a substantial presumption, 
and in many jurisdictions it is implementation of the courts’ socio-economic rights enforcement 
remedies which has proved the biggest barrier to realisation of socio-economic rights. 
However, I suggest that if New Zealand were to take the step of implementing judicially 
enforceable socio-economic rights for children, it would do so on the understanding that the 
decisions of the courts were to be implemented by the state.   
This Part begins with a brief discussion of how New Zealand might incorporate 
judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children into its constitution. I then address 
how children might make claims for enforcement of their socio-economic rights. Finally I 
explore the possible direct and indirect effects of judicial enforcement of children’s socio-
economic rights on child poverty in New Zealand.  
A Children’s socio-economic rights in the NZBORA 
For New Zealand’s children to have judicially enforceable socio-economic rights, the rights 
would need to be set out in legislation. Given New Zealand’s lack of a written constitution, the 
most suitable place to incorporate children’s socio-economic rights would be in the NZBORA. 
As noted earlier, this was suggested by some of the participants in the Constitution 
Conversation.  If children’s socio-economic rights were to be judicially enforceable, they 
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would need to be given supremacy. Therefore, they would need to be excluded from s 4 of the 
NZBORA, which provides that “No court shall, in relation to any enactment, hold any 
provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or 
ineffective, or decline to apply any provision of the enactment by reason only that the provision 
is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights.”  
The NZBORA currently only applies to “acts done” by the legislative, executive or 
judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand or any person or body in the performance 
of any public function, power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or 
pursuant to law.108 Thus if courts were to be able to issue structural enforcement remedies for 
children’s socio-economic rights, the NZBORA would need to be amended so that it applied 
not only to acts, but also to lack of action by the executive.  
Consideration would also need to be given to whether children’s socio-economic rights 
would be limited by s 5. Socio-economic rights tend to be limited in some way, though as 
Butler points out, there does not seem to be any norm when considering the articulation of 
rights limitation in different jurisdictions.109 The socio-economic rights in the UNCRC are 
themselves qualified by requiring States only to undertake measures “to the maximum extent 
of their available resources”.110 Therefore it would be reasonable to subject children’s socio-
economic rights in the NZBORA to s 5.  
I would observe however that a section 5 analysis does not apply particularly easily to 
the limitation of a socio-economic right. Consider, for example, the child’s right to adequate 
housing. Section 5 requires limitations on rights to be “prescribed by law.” This has been held 
to mean that limits must be “identifiable and expressed with sufficient precision in an Act of 
Parliament, subordinate legislation or the common law.”111 However, this is impossible in the 
context of socio-economic rights limitation; the government cannot prescribe every limitation 
by law. Imagine the government implements a policy to realise the right to adequate housing 
by ensuring every New Zealand child lives in an insulated home. This policy impliedly places 
limitations on the way the government interprets the right to adequate housing; it does not 
include the right to multiple guest bathrooms, or to a view of the sea. These are reasonable 
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limitations of course. But they are not prescribed by law. Thus socio-economic rights may need 
to be exempted from the “prescribed by law” requirement.   
A proportionality test is used in New Zealand to determine whether limitations on rights 
are “demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.” The test looks to whether the 
limit serves a purpose sufficiently important to justify curtailment of the right, and whether it 
is rationally connected with its purpose, impairing the right no more than is reasonably 
necessary for achievement of the purpose.112  However, the Supreme Court has noted that when 
a limitation involves “major political, social or economic decisions” the court will review the 
limitation less intensely than if it involves substantial legal content, giving greater deference to 
the elected branches of government when the limitation is policy-based.113 
If the courts were tasked with enforcing children’s socio-economic rights, this would 
significantly lessen the courts’ deference to the elected branches under s 5. The Court of Appeal 
has held that a section 5 analysis should consider all issues “whether they be social, legal, 
moral, economic, administrative, ethical or otherwise.”114 This broad approach to s 5 would 
become particularly important in an analysis of a limitation on a child’s socio-economic right. 
To use my earlier example, a case brought against the housing policy because it did not include 
provision for guest bathrooms will not succeed when all social, legal, moral, economic, 
administrative, ethical or other issues are considered. That limitation on the right can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. On the other hand, if the policy 
proposed that insulation would only be provided once all five-bedroom homes had been 
provided with ensuites, this is much less likely to be considered “demonstrably justifiable.” An 
enquiry into the administrative, ethical, moral and economic issues surrounding this policy 
would enable the courts to reach this decision.  
B Claiming for socio-economic rights enforcement 
If children are to have judicially enforceable socio-economic rights, the question arises as to 
how children will bring claims for rights enforcement. Children in New Zealand do not have 
access to the courts. As the Committee has emphasised, “Children’s special and dependent 
status creates real difficulties for them in pursuing remedies for breaches of their rights.”115  
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Feinberg acknowledges the argument put forward by Wellman and others, that a child 
cannot possess a legal right if that child is not able to initiate legal proceedings to enforce the 
right. Feinberg asserts that the response to this argument is that “children… start legal 
proceedings, not on their own direct initiative, but rather through the actions of proxies or 
attorneys who are empowered to speak in their names.”116   
Wellman unsurprisingly rejects this solution. He suggests that there is a “crucial 
ambiguity” in saying that a parent or guardian is acting “for” a child. For Wellman, there is a 
difference between acting “on behalf of” someone, as an agent in the place of that person, and 
“in behalf of” another, when the person acts in the best interests of or for the benefit of the 
other. Given that Wellman (and Feinberg) articulate theories of rights in which acting, by 
claiming or exercising autonomy, is an essential element of being a right-holder, Wellman 
argues that an adult must act “on behalf of” the child, as the child’s agent. It is as if the adult is 
claiming the right “on behalf of” the child. Wellman asserts that it is impossible for an adult to 
truly act in the place of a young child, because that young child is incapable of acting in that 
way at all. Therefore what the adult is really doing is acting “in behalf of” the child, that is, in 
the child’s best interests.  
To Wellman, this “fails to capture the special standing by virtue of which only the right-
holder, or someone authorized by her, can exercise a right.” It is also morally dangerous. To 
say that an adult is exercising a right of the child is to suggest that the child him or herself is 
acting, doing so through an agent or proxy rather than directly. Wellman points out that an 
adult appointing an agent does so freely, and retains control over the agent both by specifying 
the terms of the agent’s authority and by retaining the ability to withdraw or restrict that 
authority at any time. This is clearly not the case when an adult acts as an agent of a child in 
exercising or claiming for fulfilment of that child’s right.117  
Despite Wellman’s objections, there seems to be little alternative to adults bringing 
claims to the courts on behalf of children. While Nolan and others would point out that we 
must avoid making “disputable presumptions about the vulnerability, incapacity, immaturity 
and irrationality of children”118 it is also indisputable that very young children do not have the 
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ability to bring a claim to the court. Even older children are likely to need assistance in bringing 
claims, as indeed such assistance is needed by most adults. 
The Committee has instructed that States must pay particular attention to “ensuring that 
there are effective, child-sensitive procedures available to children and their representatives. 
These should include the provision of child-friendly information advice, advocacy, including 
support for self-advocacy, and access to independent complaints procedures and to the courts 
with necessary legal and other assistance.”119 
Part of the Children’s Commissioner’s current role is to “act as an advocate for 
children's interests, rights, and welfare generally (except before any court or tribunal), and, in 
that regard, to advance and monitor the application of the Convention [the UNCRC] by 
departments of State and other instruments of the Crown.”120 While it may not be appropriate 
for the Children’s Commissioner to bring cases against the State given that the Commissioner 
is a Crown entity, there are a number of groups who could be given standing to bring claims 
for socio-economic rights enforcement for New Zealand children generally. For example, the 
non-government organisations who are involved in the UNCRC Monitoring Group such as 
Unicef New Zealand and the Child Poverty Action Group could bring these claims.  
C Indirect effects  
Nolan identifies a number of extra-judicial effects which may result from the judicial 
enforcement of children’s socio-economic rights. Firstly, judicial decisions about socio-
economic rights enforcement for children may lead to heightened public awareness about such 
issues. Heightened public awareness may enable the enfranchised public to exert pressure on 
the elected branches of government regarding children’s socio-economic rights enforcement. 
It may also encourage the government to implement the court’s decision in a timely manner.121 
Similarly, Brinks and Gauri note that sometimes litigants may bring a case to court with almost 
no chance of success, simply to “open negotiations, generate publicity, or highlight government 
failures.”122 In these situations, litigation can be a viable alternative when existing policy 
infrastructure fails to recognise the deeply felt needs of citizens.  
This indirect outcome of socio-economic rights adjudication could have a positive 
effect on the levels of child poverty in New Zealand. Children’s Commissioner Russell Wills 
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recently commented that New Zealand needs a “national conversation about child poverty” 
noting that “there’s a high level of tolerance for this [child poverty] still.” 123   
Nolan suggests that if the court gives a specific order regarding a particular case, this 
may encourage more general law and policy reform by the executive and legislature. 124 A 
decision regarding the enforcement of a particular socio-economic right may place pressure on 
elected representatives to re-examine other laws or policies relating to children’s socio-
economic rights, to prevent those laws or policies being the subject of future claims.  
In a more general sense, Nolan argues that judicial decisions have the ability to alter 
the views of politicians and society in general, by “affecting the intellectual climate.”125 A 
judicial decision in favour of children’s socio-economic rights enforcement may increase the 
likelihood that future laws and policies will be more favourable towards children’s socio-
economic rights.   
D Direct effects  
Brinks and Gauri argue that “the courts are most engaged and most effective when they act in 
dialogue with political, bureaucratic, and civil society actors.”126 Their research into judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights was based on jurisdictions in the developing world, and 
their conclusions were that in order for litigation of socio-economic rights to produce 
significant “real-world” effects, the ability to litigate these rights must be coupled with positive 
state, social and political conditions. I would suggest that at least in comparison to many of the 
governments in the developing world, New Zealand can indeed be said to enjoy positive state, 
social and political conditions which could provide a context for “real-world” effects as a result 
of socio-economic rights litigation.  
However, I suggest that perhaps the most important factor in determining the effect that 
judicially enforceable socio-economic rights enforcement might have on child poverty in New 
Zealand would be the approach the New Zealand courts decided to take regarding remedies. 
This is because the nature of child poverty in New Zealand is likely to influence how effective 
a particular remedy might be. As identified at the beginning of my paper, approximately a 
quarter New Zealand’s children can be said to be living in some of form of poverty.  
As the Children’s Commissioner argued in his report to the United Nations Committee 
on the Right to the Child, New Zealand has generally good outcomes when it comes to areas 
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such as education and the health status of children. Not all New Zealand’s children are poor, 
and the majority of New Zealand’s children experience the realisation of their socio-economic 
rights. Yet there is a group of approximately 25 per cent of New Zealand’s children who 
consistently “fall well behind” in these areas.127  
The Children’s Commissioner has identified the kind of poverty that these children live 
in as a “persistent feature” in New Zealand. They are victims of “persistent disparities”. For 
example, in his report the Committee, the Commissioner commended the government on the 
implementation of Working for Families, which has made many New Zealand children better 
off. However, he noted that despite the Working for Families system, there remains a persistent 
25 per cent of children living in poverty. Most of these children do not benefit from a tax credit 
system, because their parents are not employed (and often never have been). They are also the 
children who may never find a job themselves, because, for instance, they missed too much of 
their early schooling, as they were ill with rheumatic fever, as a result of their houses being too 
cold and overcrowded. The parents of these children have failed to fulfil their children’s socio-
economic rights, some for a lack of trying, but others for a genuine lack of resources. If we 
recognise that the state has a role in the fulfilment of children’s socio-economic rights when 
parents fail to fulfil their duties towards their children, then these children may indeed benefit 
from socio-economic rights enforcement if the remedy granted by the courts is effective.  
An individualised rights enforcement remedy is unlikely to have a significant impact 
on child poverty in New Zealand. As discussed earlier, individualised remedies tend to only 
benefit those who can afford to litigate. For those parents whose children are living in poverty, 
litigating for realisation of their child’s socio-economic rights is not likely to be a high priority. 
While it is possible that the non-government organisations identified above may bring cases on 
behalf of individual children, this is unlikely to have a significant impact on levels of child 
poverty in New Zealand, simply because individualised remedies only enforce one child’s right 
at a time.  
The negative injunction method may bring a greater benefit for poor children in New 
Zealand than Landau would suggest. While Landau argued that this remedy tends to primarily 
benefit the middle and upper classes because they have existing social benefits, I argue that 
New Zealand does not necessarily fit within this identified trend. New Zealand’s welfare state 
origins and its refusal to adopt a social insurance approach to social security means that it is 
                                                             
127 Angus, above n 76, at 2.  
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not the upper and middle classes who would necessarily benefit most from the court’s adoption 
of a negative injunction method. Pensions and health care subsidies are not distributed on a 
contributory model in New Zealand, and therefore the poor are just as likely to benefit from 
the court’s striking down of retrogressive laws and policies as the rich. Of course, New Zealand 
does not pay benefits directly to children, but it is easy to envisage an argument being made on 
behalf of a child that his or her socio-economic rights would be infringed if the parent who 
supported them was to have his or her benefits removed.  
The fact that child poverty in New Zealand is relative rather than abject may also mean 
that a negative injunction remedy is more effective in New Zealand than in some developing 
world jurisdictions. Take for example, a government’s proposal to remove an existing policy 
which subsidises insulation for rental properties. Landau would argue that in the South African 
context, the court’s granting of a negative injunction to prevent the removal of this policy will 
not benefit the poorest children, because they do not live in rental properties at all; they live in 
tin shacks in slums. In New Zealand on the other hand, a negative injunction to prevent removal 
of this policy is likely to have a significant impact on the poorest children, because they will 
benefit greatly from better insulation in their families’ rental homes.  
However, the negative injunction method also requires that those who require socio-
economic rights enforcement have access to the courts. Therefore this method’s success would 
also be predicated on there being groups willing to bring claims on behalf of children, as 
discussed above.  
The possible impacts of weak form review and the stronger structural enforcement 
remedy are particularly interesting to consider in a New Zealand context. The major downfall 
of weak form review is that a court’s order is at risk of being ignored by the government, or 
that the steps the government takes to address the court’s order will not be sufficient to have 
any real impact on its failure to provide the socio-economic right in question. Structural 
enforcement remedies avoid this by providing a more prescriptive set of steps for governments 
to take in order to provide for the socio-economic right.  
I suggest that the impact of these remedies will depend on the reasons for why there is 
a persistent group of children who experience poverty in New Zealand. Do they remain in 
poverty because of government apathy towards their socio-economic rights realisation, or is it 
because the government is putting in place laws and policies that simply are not working? It is 
probably a combination of both, and this may influence the extent to which socio-economic 
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rights enforcement by the courts in the form of weak form review or structural enforcement 
will have an effect on child poverty. If those children in the deepest poverty are suffering from 
government apathy towards their lack of socio-economic rights realisation, then weak form 
review may be sufficient to draw government attention to the issue and require some form of 
policy attempt to address enforcement of the socio-economic right. As suggested above, the 
New Zealand context means that the government is less likely to simply ignore a weak form 
review court order in the same way that the South African government was prepared to.  
However, a structural enforcement remedy may be necessary in situations where the 
courts perceive that current government policies are insufficient in bringing about realisation 
of socio-economic rights for New Zealand’s very poorest children. Take, for example, the 
number of New Zealand who currently go to school without having eaten breakfast. There is a 
strong argument that this is a violation of those children’s socio-economic right to a standard 
of living adequate for physical development under Article 27 of the UNCRC. While the 
government may argue that the Working for Families tax credit system is a legitimate attempt 
to fulfil this socio-economic right for these children by providing their parents with extra 
money for food, as the Children’s Commissioner has pointed out, the poorest of New Zealand’s 
children receive no benefit under this scheme because their parents are not in work. In this 
situation, a structural enforcement remedy may be necessary to truly enforce the right to an 
adequate standard of living for these children.  
VII Conclusion 
This paper began by introducing the issue of child poverty in New Zealand, showing that child 
poverty is something that affects nearly a quarter of those in New Zealand under the age of 
eighteen. It demonstrated that child poverty has become a priority of the Office of the 
Children’s Commissioner, whose role it is to advocate for New Zealand’s children. It also drew 
on the results of the recent Constitution Conversation in New Zealand, suggesting that there is 
some public interest in the idea of judicially enforceable socio-economic rights, and certainly 
interest in the impact that better recognition of socio-economic rights for children may have on 
child poverty. It then considered the foundational international human rights treaties affirming 
children’s socio-economic rights, that is, the ICESCR and the UNCRC, suggesting the New 
Zealand has obligations under these treaties to respect, protect and fulfil the socio-economic 
rights of children in this country.  
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I presented for reasons why there is a strong case for judicially enforceable socio-
economic rights for children as a particular group. Children are disproportionately vulnerable 
to socio-economic rights violations and have a limited ability to realise their own socio-
economic rights. They are reliant on others to fulfil their duties towards them in order for their 
socio-economic rights to be fully realised. Children also have limited civil and political rights, 
and perhaps most importantly, are denied the right to vote. Children’s lack of ability to 
influence the democratic process and the lack of governmental accountability toward them 
means that the judiciary arguably has a more important role in ensuring the fulfilment of their 
socio-economic rights.  
The paper then addressed the idea of judicial socio-economic rights enforcement 
generally, paying particular attention to the ways in which courts can enforce socio-economic 
rights. It also posited that while parents clearly owe duties towards their children in relation to 
socio-economic rights realisation, the state also owes duties towards children when parents are 
unable to fulfil these duties.  
I then addressed the idea of judicially enforceable socio-economic rights for children 
in New Zealand. I suggested that New Zealand could incorporate such rights into the 
NZBORA, and that there would be groups who could bring claims on behalf of New Zealand’s 
children for enforcement of their socio-economic rights. I argued that New Zealand’s social 
and political context may lead to positive indirect effects of socio-economic rights enforcement 
on child poverty.  
Finally, I argued that the effect of judicial socio-economic rights enforcement in New 
Zealand would largely depend on which remedy the courts were willing to implement. I 
suggested that individual rights enforcement would not have a particularly significant effect on 
a problem which affects nearly a quarter of New Zealand’s children. However, the negative 
injunction method may be more effective in New Zealand than it has proved in other 
jurisdictions, because child poverty in New Zealand is relative rather than abject.  Weak form 
review and structural enforcement remedies may both have a positive impact on child poverty 
in New Zealand, either by requiring the government to address a particular socio-economic 
right which has not been the subject of policy considerations, or by providing a more specific 
order which requires the government to fulfil socio-economic rights which are not being 
sufficiently addressed by current government policy.  
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